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INTRODUCTION
Over the last decade, courts have increasingly struggled with a problem in
sexual harassment doctrine: Title VII, the statute under which most federal
claims of sexual harassment are brought, does not explicitly prohibit sexual
harassment. Instead, the statute makes it unlawful for an employer to
discriminate "against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms,
conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's... sex."
1
Legal scholars have given two explanations for why sexual harassment is
unlawful under Title VII. In one camp, scholars have argued that sexual
harassment is unlawful because it is "a form of sex discrimination." These
scholars have focused on defining discrimination and explaining why sexual
harassment qualifies as discrimination under their definition.2 The argument then
becomes a syllogism: Title VII prohibits sex discrimination; sexual harassment
is sex discrimination; therefore, Title VII prohibits sexual harassment. For
example, Catharine MacKinnon argued over twenty years ago that all sexual
harassment is sex discrimination because the act reinforces the social inequality
of women to men.
3
In the other camp, scholars have argued that Title VII does not necessarily
prohibit all sexual harassment because the statute only makes it illegal for
employers to treat men and women differently.4 Under this definition of sex
1. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (2000). See infra note 14 for the statute's text.
2. E.g., CATHARINE A. MAcKINNON, SEXUAL HARASSMENT OF WORKING WOMEN: A CASE OF SEX
DISCRIMINATION 116-18 (1979) (arguing that sexual harassment is sex discrimination because it reinforces the
social inequality of women to men); Kathryn Abrams, The New Jurisprudence of Sexual Harassment, 83
CORNELL L. REv. 1169, 1172 (1998) (arguing for a new theory of sexual harassment that characterizes sexual
harassment as "a phenomenon to preserve male control and entrench masculine norms"); Katherine M. Franke,
What's Wrong with Sexual Harassment, 49 STAN. L. REV. 691, 772 (1997) (arguing that sexual harassment "is a
practice, grounded and undertaken in the service of hetero-patriarchal norms. These norms, regulatory,
constitutive, and punitive in nature, produce gendered subjects: feminine women as sex objects and masculine
men as sex subjects. On this account, sexual harassment is sex discrimination precisely because its use and
effect police hetero-patriarchal gender norms in the workplace .... " (emphasis added)); Vicki Schultz,
Reconceptualizing Sexual Harassment, 107 YALE L.J. 1683, 1775, 1803 (1998) (arguing that "harassment has
the form and function of denigrating women's competence for the purpose of keeping them away from male-
dominated jobs or incorporating them as inferior, less capable workers" and that courts should adopt a
"'competence centered' paradigm, for it understands harassment as a means to reclaim favored lines of work
and work competence as masculine-identified turf. . . . [As case law shows] hostile work environment
harassment is simply a form of gender discrimination" (emphasis added)); Linda B. Epstein, Note, What Is a
Gender Norm and Why Should We Care? Implementing a New Theory in Sexual Harassment Law, 51 STAN. L.
REv. 161, 180-81 (1998) (arguing that courts should apply a "unified theory of gender-norm harassment that
encompasses sexual and nonsexual but sex-based conduct .... [I]f sexualizing women was recast as enforcing
upon women the gender norm of 'sexual object,' that enforcement is inherently a discriminatory one"
(emphasis added)).
3. MACKNNON, supra note 2, at 174.
4. E.g., Rebecca Harmer White, There s Nothing Special About Sex: The Supreme Court Mainstreams
Sexual Harassment, 7 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 725, 735 (1999) (arguing that the Supreme Court merged
sexual harassment with other types of Title VII claims and that employers are not necessarily liable for all
sexual harassment); Steven L. Willbom, Taking Discrimination Seriously: Oncale and the Fare of
Exceptionalism in Sexual Harassment Law, 7 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 677, 723 (1999) (arguing courts
should treat Title VII's discrimination element seriously and find that discrimination only exists whenever
women are treated differently than men).
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discrimination, Title VII prohibits sexual harassment only if it happens because
an employee is male or female. Every Title VII claim thus involves a question of
causation: "But for" the plaintiffs' sex would they have been treated differently?
5
For example, if an employer sexually harasses employees when they advocate
feminist beliefs, the employer is treating them poorly not because of their sex but
"because of' their political views, and such sexual harassment would not be
unlawful.
Courts have fluctuated between these two incompatible approaches
depending on the type of case being decided. In the paradigmatic case of a
heterosexual man sexually harassing a heterosexual woman, courts have




These courts have held that the plaintiff has a claim if she proves that she was
sexually harassed. 7 But in cases of same-sex sexual harassment or the sexual
harassment of gay men and lesbians, courts have held that employers are not
necessarily liable even if the plaintiff was sexually harassed.8 These courts have
emphasized that Title VII's crucial inquiry is not whether the plaintiff was
5. E.g., Willbom, supra note 4, at 704. This view is consistent with early sexual harassment cases that
explicitly adopted a "but for" causation analysis. See infra note 16 and accompanying text.
6. E.g., Provencher v. CVS Pharmacy, 145 F.3d 5, 13 (1st Cir. 1998) ("Sexual harassment is a form of
gender discrimination prohibited by Title VII."); Sprague v. Thorn Ams., Inc., 129 F.3d 1355, 1365 (10th Cir.
1997) ("It is beyond contention that Title VII prohibits sexual harassment in the workplace."); Fleming v.
Boeing Co., 120 F.3d 242, 244 (1 th Cir. 1997) ("Sexual harassment is a form of sexual discrimination within
the meaning of Title VII."); Mattem v. Eastman Kodak Co., 104 F.3d 702, 715 (5th Cir. 1997) ("A claim of
'hostile environment' sexual harassment is a form of sex discrimination that is actionable under Title VII.");
Bator v. Hawaii, 39 F.3d 1021, 1028-29 (9th Cir. 1994) ("Courts have recognized that sexual harassment is sex
discrimination in violation of Title VII at least since 1977."); Poe v. Haydon, 853 F.2d 418, 428 (6th Cir. 1988)
("[T'he Supreme Court ruled [in Meritor] that 'hostile environment' sexual harassment is a form of sex
discrimination.").
7. That is, courts have prohibited sexual harassment per se in these cases, although the standard approach
has taken two forms. See Willborn, supra note 4, at 681-83. The first form is exemplified by the Ninth Circuit
which does not make "discrimination because of such individual's sex" an explicit element of the cause of
action. Thus, to prevail at trial, plaintiffs must prove they were
1) subjected to sexual advances, requests for sexual favors, or other verbal or physical conduct of a
sexual nature; 2) the conduct was unwelcome; and 3) that the harassment affected a tangible aspect
of employment; or the conduct was sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of
employment and create an abusive working environment.
Ellison v. Brady, 924 F2d 872, 875-76 (9th Cir. 1991); Jordan v. Clark, 847 F.2d 1368, 1373 (9th Cir. 1988).
This is also consistent with the Equal Employment Opportunities Commission's definition. See infra note 23
(providing EEOC's definition).
The second form of the standard test requires, as a formal matter, that the plaintiff prove the harassment
was "based on sex" or happened "because of sex" in addition to the other elements. In most cases involving
sexual conduct, however, courts have simply assumed that that the conduct was sex discrimination, especially if
the case involved male-female harassment. See Willbom, supra note 4, at 682-83. Indeed, I have not found a
single case decided before Oncale in which a man sexually harassed a woman and the court held that the
"because of such individual's sex" element was not satisfied.
8. E.g., McWilliams v. Fairfax County Bd. of Supervisors, 72 F.3d 1191, 1195-96 (4th Cir. 1996)
(emphasizing the "because of sex" requirement in same-sex sexual harassment case and holding that
McWilliams was not sexually harassed "because of' his sex but for other reasons, perhaps "because of' his
"known or believed prudery, or shyness"); Higgins v. New Balance Athletic Shoe, Inc., 21 R Supp. 2d 66, 73
(D. Me. 1998) (holding that frequent verbal and physical abuse involving sexual conduct by supervisors and
co-workers because of animus toward plaintiff's sexual orientation is not "because of sex" and plaintiff must
offer sex-based evidence to show harassment under Oncale); Martin v. Norfolk S. Ry. Co., 926 F. Supp. 1044,
1049-50 (N.D. Ala. 1996) (holding that same-sex hostile environment cases with heterosexual harassers did not
provide any assurance that the conduct occurred because of the victim's sex).
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sexually harassed, but whether the plaintiff would have been treated differently if
the plaintiff had been the opposite sex.
9
The goal of this article is to show why courts may legitimately prohibit all
sexual harassment regardless of the approach they adopt or their definition of
discrimination. Thus, the basic conclusion is that plaintiffs should have a Title
VII claim if they prove that they were sexually harassed, regardless of their sex,
sexual orientation or any other fact.10 The article's central point is that one must
make two claims to conclude that interpreting Title VII to prohibit all workplace
sexual harassment is illegitimate. The first claim is that "discrimination because
of such individual's sex" means treating men and women differently. Academic
literature and courts have focused exclusively on this point when arguing against
prohibiting all sexual harassment. However, critics must make a second claim
for their conclusion to follow. Specifically, they must argue that courts may not
interpret Title VII in such an overinclusive manner as to prohibit all sexual
harassment. Thus far, this argument has not received any attention.
This article assumes, arguendo, that sex discrimination means treating men
and women differently but nonetheless concludes that courts should prohibit all
sexual harassment because it serves as a good adjudicative rule to apply to
individual cases. Rules always produce mistakes by sweeping too broadly or
narrowly if measured against the reasons that justify them. Nonetheless, courts
legitimately (and frequently) use judicially made rules to decide cases because
they serve other values that the law seeks to promote. Specifically, rules lower
the costs of making individual decisions, reduce arbitrary and biased decisions,
and increase predictability for those affected by the law. These virtues justify
prohibiting all sexual harassment under Title VII. If this argument is correct,
even those who argue that the proper interpretation of Title VII means employers
may not "treat men and women differently" should nonetheless agree that courts
can legitimately prohibit all sexual harassment. 1
This article is organized as follows. Part I of the article explores the
argument that sex discrimination means treating men and women differently and
proposes a framework for understanding when sexual harassment meets this
definition. Part II examines why courts should prohibit all sexual harassment
regardless of the victim's sex, sexual orientation or any other personal
9. E.g., Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., 523 U.S. 75, 81 (1998) (stating in same-sex sexual
harassment case that "[w]hatever evidentiary route the plaintiff chooses to follow, he or she must always prove
that the conduct at issue was not merely tinged with offensive sexual connotations, but actually constituted
'discrimina[tion]... because of... sex."'); Mcgilliams, 72 F.3d at 1195 (emphasizing Title VII's "because of
sex" requirement).
10. Of course, a plaintiff must still prove that the employer is in some way responsible, and hence liable,
for the sexual harassment.
II. In this way, I am arguing for an "incompletely theorized agreement"-an agreement that sexual
harassment is illegal under Title VII to which people with competing views of the appropriate interpretation of
Title VII can subscribe. See Cass R. Sunstein, Incompletely Theorized Agreements, 108 HARv. L. REv. 1733,
1739-42 (1995) (describing "incompletely theorized agreements" as agreements on a particular issue without
agreement on the underlying principle and suggesting that such a strategy can promote consensus in a
pluralistic democracy); see also CASS R SUNSTEIN, LEGAL REASONING AND POLITICAL CONFLICT 35-44 (1996)
(arguing that well-functioning legal systems tend to produce incompletely theorized agreements).
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characteristic. This part applies the previous framework to examine how a
categorical prohibition of sexual harassment would sweep too broadly. It then
examines the virtues of adopting a bright-line rule against sexual harassment.
Part III places the argument in a broader judicial context. It first suggests the
direction courts should take after the Supreme Court's decision in Oncale v.
Sundowner Offshore Services.12 It then situates sexual harassment within current
Title VII doctrine as a whole. Finally, it examines areas of law outside Title VII
in which courts must answer a question of causation or whether something
happened "because of' something else. In each area, one can find examples of
courts answering these questions by drawing bright-line rules based on the proof
of a particular fact or conduct. Thus, prohibiting all sexual harassment under a
statute that prohibits sex discrimination can be viewed as part of a common
approach taken by courts when deciding questions of causation.
I. AN ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK FOR UNDERSTANDING TITLE VII
According to those who assert that Title VII does not prohibit all sexual
harassment, the statute focuses on two things: the employer's behavior and the
reasons motivating that behavior.13 First, the employer's behavior must affect the
"compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment." Second, such
behavior must happen "because of such individual's . . . sex." 14 To illustrate,
consider that no federal law prohibits an employer from hiring, promoting or
terminating employees because they are politically liberal. Title VII does
prohibit the same behavior, however, if it happens because the employee is a
woman or a man. Thus, a key to understanding this approach to Title VII is to
separate an employer's behavior from an employer's motives.
The text of Title VII, of course, does not prohibit sexual harassment. Rather,
it prohibits sexual harassment that affects the "compensation, terms, conditions,
or privileges of employment" and happens "because of such individual's ...
sex.'15 This approach seeks to answer a question of but-for causation: Would the
employee have suffered the sexual harassment "but for" his or her sex?'
16
12. 523 U.S. 75 (1998).
13. 1 discussed this framework in Brian Lehman, The Equal Protection Problem in Sexual Harassment
Doctrine, 10 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 125 (2000). Portions of this section are from that article.
14. Title V1I reads in part:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer-
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any
individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because
of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin; or
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for employment in any way which
would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment opportunities or otherwise adversely
affect his status as an employee, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national
origin.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (2000).
15. Id.
16. This interpretation has strong roots in the first cases to establish that sexual harassment violated Title
VII. Bundy v. Jackson, 641 F2d 934, 942 n.7 (D.C. Cir. 1981) ("[l]n each instance the question is one of but-
for causation: would the complaining employee have suffered the harassment had he or she been of a different
2000]
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Because sexual harassment does not necessarily happen "because of such
individual's sex," one must determine when it (or any other behavior) is
motivated by the fact that the plaintiff is a woman or man-in the sense that it
would not have happened to a similar person of the opposite sex.
In both case law and academic scholarship, one can identify three motives
that meet the "but for" definition and distinguish acts that happen "because of
such individual's sex" from acts that happen for other reasons. 17 An employer's
behavior qualifies as sex discrimination if motivated in part by (1) sexual
attraction, (2) gender animus or (3) gender stereotypes. An employer motivated
by these reasons, at least in part, treats the employee differently because of that
person's sex; in each case, "but for" the employee's sex, the employer would not
have treated him or her in such a fashion. It is important to note, however, that
Title VII does not prohibit all behavior that falls into one of these categories
because the conduct must still rise to the level of affecting the "compensation,
terms, conditions, or privileges of employment." To expound on this framework,
consider each motivation in turn.
Sexual attraction. If a person is sexually attracted to one sex, and acts on that
desire, then the conduct is discriminatory. 18 For example, if a heterosexual
female employer assigns a male employee to a job because she is sexually
attracted to him, her motive is discriminatory. "But for" his sex, he would not
have been assigned to the job.
Gender animus. If a person hates one sex, and acts on that hate, then the
conduct is discriminatory. An employer violates Title VII when he does not hire
a qualified woman for a job because he hates women. "But for" the woman's
sex, she would have been hired.
Gender stereotyping. If a person acts on gender stereotypes, then the conduct
is discriminatory. Gender stereotypes consist of a set of beliefs about the
gender?") (first appellate case to establish a hostile environment claim of sexual harassment); Barnes v. Costle,
561 F.2d 983, 990 (D.C. Cir. 1977) ("But for her womanhood, from aught that appears, her participation in
sexual activity would never have been solicited.") (first appellate case to establish a quid pro quo claim of
sexual harassment); see also Jones v. Flagship Int'l, 793 F.2d 714, 719 (5th Cir. 1986) ("[T]he harassment
complained of was based upon sex, i.e., that but for the fact of her sex, the plaintiff would not have been the
object of harassment"); McKinney v. Dole, 765 F.2d 1129, 1138 (D.C. Cir. 1985) ("[W]e hold that any
harassment or other unequal treatment of an employee or group of employees that would not occur but for the
sex of the employee or employees may, if sufficiently patterned or pervasive, comprise an illegal condition of
employment under Title VII."); Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 904 (11th Cir. 1982) ("In proving a
claim for a hostile work environment due to sexual harassment, therefore, the plaintiff must show that but for
the fact of her sex, she would not have been the object of harassment.").
17. Lehman, supra note 13, at 137.
18. Thus, the "bisexual harasser" is not liable under Title VII because the behavior does not turn on the
sex of the employee. See Henson, 682 F.2d at 905 n.ll (11th Cir. 1982) ("Except in the exceedingly atypical
case of a bisexual supervisor, it should be clear that sexual harassment is discrimination based upon sex.");
Bundy v. Jackson, 641 F.2d 934, 942 n.7 (D.C. Cir. 1981) ("Only by a reductio ad absurdum could we imagine
a case of harassment that is not sex discrimination where a bisexual supervisor harasses men and women
alike."); Barnes v. Costle, 561 F.2d 983, 990 n.55 (D.C. Cir. 1977) ("In the case of a bisexual superior, the
insistence upon sexual favors would not constitute gender discrimination because it would apply to male and
female employees alike."). See generally Sandra Levitsky, Footnote 55: Closing the "Bisexual Defense"
Loophole in itle VII Sexual Harassment Cases, 80 MiNN. L. REv. 1013 (1996) (explaining the establishment
of the bisexual defense loophole).
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characteristics men and women possess and the societal roles they occupy.19 A
person can discriminate by relying on gender stereotypes in two ways. First, the
stereotypes can serve as descriptive generalizations about men and women. For
example, employers may assign women and men to different jobs because of the
generalization that "men are more assertive and independent than women" or
because women "make better secretaries."
Second, gender stereotypes can reflect beliefs about how men and women
should act or behave.20 Thus, an employer may react adversely to women and
men who do not conform to specific gender stereotypes. For instance, an
employer may not promote a woman because she is "too aggressive" and lacks
"interpersonal skills."2' No particular animus towards women motivates the
employer. Rather, the employer believes that men and women should act or
behave in different ways. Nonetheless, "but for" her sex, the employee would
not be thought too aggressive or lacking in interpersonal skills.
22
A. When the Typical Case of Sexual Harassment Violates itle VII
This framework shows when the paradigmatic case of sexual harassment-a
heterosexual male sexually harassing a heterosexual female-qualifies as sex
discrimination. Over the last twenty years, courts have recognized two types of
claims under the rubric of "sexual harassment": quid pro quo and hostile work
23environment claims. Quid pro quo harassment occurs when a supervisor seeks
19. Kay Deaux & Marianne LaFrance, Gender, in 1 THE HANDBOOK OF SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 788, 793
(Daniel T. Gilbert et al. eds., 1998).
20. Id.
21. See Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989).
22. Behavior motivated by gender stereotypes is discriminatory only when it treats men and women
differently, however. Thus, an employer does not violate Title VII if he hires (or fires) only independent and
aggressive employees, even though such characteristics are typically viewed as "masculine." In comparison,
employers do violate Title VII if they base employment decision on the expectations that women will not or
should not act aggressively.
23. Catharine MacKinnon was the first person to divide sexual harassment claims into two categories.
See MACKINNON, supra note 2, at 32-42. MacKinnon labeled the first type "quid pro quo," meaning sexual
harassment "in which sexual compliance is exchanged, or proposed to be exchanged, for an employment
opportunity." Id. at 32. According to MacKinnon, the second type "arises when sexual harassment is a
persistent condition of work." Id. In 1980, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission followed
MacKinnon's framework in adopting guidelines prohibiting sexual harassment. The EEOC's guidelines on
sexual harassment state in full:
Harassment on the basis of sex is a violation of section 703 of title VII. Unwelcome sexual advances,
requests for sexual favors, and other verbal or physical conduct of a sexual nature constitute sexual
harassment when (1) submission to such conduct is made either explicitly or implicitly a term or
condition of an individual's employment, (2) submission to or rejection of such conduct by an
individual is used as the basis for employment decisions affecting such individual, or (3) such
conduct has the purpose or effect of unreasonably interfering with an individual's work performance
or creating an intimidating, hostile, or offensive working environment.
29 C.F.R § 1604.1 l(a) (2000). The first two subsections encompass "quid pro quo" harassment, while the third
one refers to "hostile work environment" harassment. The Supreme Court recognized this distinction when it
heard its first sexual harassment case. Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 64-65 (1986).
The Supreme Court weakened the distinction between quid pro quo and hostile work environment
harassment in Burlington Industries v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742 (1998). Burlington rejected the distinction between
quid pro quo and hostile environment harassment as a basis for determining whether to apply strict or
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sexual favors in return for job benefits. A common example of this harassment is
the statement "sleep with me or you are fired." In comparison, hostile work
environment harassment occurs when a harasser's sexual conduct creates an
intimidating, hostile or offensive work environment. For example, a hostile work
environment may be created if a supervisor repeatedly makes sexual innuendo
about an employees' clothes, asks employees to retrieve coins from his pockets,
calls co-workers "dumb ass [women]," and makes comments such as "We need
a man as manager.,
24
The discriminatory element behind quid pro quo claims is a sexual attraction
aimed only at one sex.25 If a heterosexual male supervisor fires a female
employee because she rejects his sexual advances, he has violated Title VII. The
conduct is discriminatory because he would not have made sexual advances to a
male employee.
In contrast, hostile work environment harassment may be motivated by
sexual attraction, gender animus or gender stereotypes. Such a claim might
involve a supervisor's repetitive and unwelcome sexual advances that create a
hostile work environment. This would qualify as discriminatory for the same
reasons quid pro quo claims violate Title VII (such behavior is not aimed at male
employees).
Sexual desire, however, is not the only motive that qualifies certain behavior
26as sex discrimination. A man motivated by gender animus may sexually harass
a woman because "[w]omen are only fit company for something that howls ....
[T]here's nothing worse than having to work around women."27 Or a man may
sexually harass a woman because she is attempting to do a "man's job" or she
needs to act "like a woman." Such a harasser may be trying to put the woman "in
her place." In this case, gender stereotypes motivate the harasser. In each
example, the sexual harassment qualifies as sex discrimination because it would
not have happened "but for" the victim's sex.
B. The Principal Criticism: Not all sexual harassment is sex discrimination
Using this framework, one can discern the main objection to courts' holding
all sexual harassment unlawful under Title VII: Sexual harassment does not
necessarily happen because a person is a man or woman. A person might
sexually harass an employee in a way that does not meet the "but for" test, in
negligence-based employer liability, respectively, for employees' behavior. Id. at 751-52. In rejecting that
distinction, the Court stated, "Ihe terms quidpro quo and hostile work environment are helpful, perhaps, in
making a rough demarcation between cases in which threats are carried out and those where they are not or are
absent altogether, but beyond this are of limited utility." Id. Thus, the principal difference between hostile work
environment and quid pro quo is currently whether the harasser made a threat of adverse employment action
and then carried it out (e.g., denied overtime or promotional opportunities).
24. Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 18 (1993).
25. See supra note 18 (discussing bisexual harasser).
26. Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., 523 U.S. 75, 80 (1998) (stating "harassing conduct need not
be motivated by sexual desire to support an inference of discrimination on the basis of sex").
27. Robinson v. Jacksonville Shipyards, Inc., 760 F. Supp. 1486, 1498 (M.D. Fla. 1991).
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which case the harassment would not qualify as sex discrimination. For example,
a supervisor may say "sleep with me or you're fired" as a joke.28 One can
certainly imagine an employer sexually harassing male and female employees
for a myriad of reasons other than employee's sex (e.g., because the employee is
shy, a "tattletale," advocates feminist beliefs, etc.). Regardless of the sex or
sexual orientation of either party, a harasser motivated by such reasons has not
sexually harassed the employee "because of such individual's sex."
The fact that not all sexual harassment qualifies as sex discrimination
becomes clearer as one moves away from the paradigmatic example of sexual
harassment. If one assumes that the harasser is a heterosexual man,29 then there
are three types of situations that fall outside of the typical sexual harassment
case. Namely, the victim might be a heterosexual man, a lesbian or a gay man. In
such cases it becomes clearer that not all sexual harassment qualifies as sex
discrimination.
1. The Sexual Harassment of Heterosexual Men
First consider an example of heterosexual men sexually harassing a
heterosexual man. Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services30 may provide the
most familiar example of this situation. Oncale involved allegations that from
the start of his employment, Joseph Oncale was barraged with verbal harassment
by three men, John Lyons, Danny Pippen and Brandon Johnson.3 Their
comments ranged from "[y]ou know you got a cute little ass, boy" to threats of
32 3rape. Moreover, the men sexually assaulted Oncale on three occasions.33 In the
most graphic incident, the men attacked Oncale as he showered.34 While Pippen
28. Jansen v. Packaging Corp. of Am., 123 F.3d 490, 567, 569 (1997) (en banc) (Wood, J., joined by
Easterbrook & Rovner, JJ., concurring and dissenting) (stating a supervisor may make constant demands for
sex in exchange for job benefits "maybe in jest, maybe not").
29. This assumption should be uncontroversial since most harassers are men. See, e.g., Louise Fitzgerald
et al., The Incidence and Dimensions of Sexual Harassment in Academia and the Workplace, 32 J. VOCATIONAL
BEHAV. 152 (1988) (finding that 90 to 95% of sexual harassers are men). If harassers, as a group, mirror the
general population, then most of the harassers will be heterosexual as well. Cf MacKinnon, infra note 31, at 30
(stating "so far as is known, most men who sexually abuse men are heterosexual" and citing MICHAEL SCARCE,
MALE ON MALE RAPE: THE HIDDEN TOLL OF STIGMA AND SHAME 17 (1997), which reviewed 14 studies on the
sexual abuse of men by men). In contrast, women sexually harass men far less. See MARTHA J. LANGELAN,
BACK OFF! How To CONFRONT AND STOP SEXUAL HARASSMENT AND HARASSERS 50-51 (1993) (citing statistics
gathered by the National Association of Working Women showing that only one percent of harassment cases
involved women harassing men).
30. 523 U.S. 75 (1998).
31. Brief for Petitioner, Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., 523 U.S. 75 (1998) (No. 96-568); see also
Catharine A. MacKinnon, Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Serv., Inc., 96-568, Amici Curiae Brief in Support of
Petitioner, 8 UCLA WOMEN'S L.J. 9, 13 (1997).
32. Mackinnon, supra note 31, at 13-14.
33. Id. at 13-14.
34. Id. The first assault occurred on October 25, 1991, while Oncale traveled by boat to another oil
platform. Id. Danny Pippen grabbed and pulled Oncale down, ultimately pinning him. Id. Lyons then came
over, unzipped his pants "pulled out his penis, and stuck it onto the back of Oncale's head." Id. Lyons and
Pippen both laughed as Oncale asked them to stop. Id. The second assault occurred the next day when Brandon
Johnson grabbed and forced Oncale to the ground. Id. While Oncale was on the ground, "Lyons pulled his
penis out and put it on Oncale's arm." Id. The third assault occurred that same night as Oncale showered. Id.
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pinned Oncale, Lyons forced a bar of soap into his anus and told him "they're
fixing to fluck [him]."" The threats continued and Oncale eventually quit
because he feared he would be raped.36
Under these facts, Joseph Oncale was sexually harassed.37 The alleged
behavior was sexual, involving claims of sexual assault and other sexual
conduct, and it created a hostile work environment. But if one does not define
sexual harassment as "a form of sex discrimination" the question remains
whether the sexual harassment would have happened "but for" the fact that
Oncale was a man. That is, would the men still have harassed Joseph Oncale if
he were a woman?
The framework above helps one answer whether such cases qualify as sex
discrimination. Although still possible, most men do not have an animus towards
men as a group.38 And if one assumes, as a fact, that the harassers are
heterosexual then one can say that sexual attraction did not motivate the
harassment. Whether such behavior qualifies as sex discrimination under the
framework above thus turns in most cases on whether gender stereotypes
motivated the harassment. For example, if the men harassed Oncale because he
acted "too much like a woman" or was "too feminine for a man," then it would
qualify as sex discrimination. 39 On the other hand, if he was sexually harassed
for other reasons then it was not sex discrimination.
It is worth emphasizing that under the "but for" framework above, nothing
about the sexual harassment inherently makes it different from other Title VII
cases. If Oncale was fired rather than sexually harassed for discriminatory
reasons, then the employer would still have violated Title VII because the "terms
and conditions" of his employment would have been affected. Under this
framework, it is the employer's motive that makes an act sex discrimination, not
the employer's behavior.
2. The Sexual Harassment of Lesbians and Gay Men
The framework above also refines the arguments for and against prohibiting
the sexual harassment of lesbians and gay men. Courts have been reluctant to
recognize the sexual harassment of gay men and lesbians under Title VII
35. Id. at 13.
36. Id. Lyons made repeated threats to rape Oncale including: "If I don't get you now, I'll get you later.
I'm going to get you. You're going to give it to me .... and "You told your daddy, huh? Well, it ain't going to
do you no good because I'm going to flick you anyway." Id. at 14. When asked during a deposition why he left
Sundowner, Oncale stated, "I felt that if I didn't leave my job, that I would be raped or forced to have sex." 523
U.S. at 77. Oncale's pink slip stated he "voluntarily left due to sexual harassment and verbal abuse." Id.
37. The district court never made a finding of fact because the case settled after the Supreme Court
remanded it. See Settlement Reached in Harassment Suit, WASH. TIMES, October 26, 1998, at A9 (discussing
the undisclosed settlement).
38. See Craig R. Waldo, Jennifer L. Berdahl & Louise F. Fitzgerald, Are Men Sexually Harassed? If So,
by Whom?, 22 LAW& HuM. BEHAV. 59, 72 (1998).
39. See Mary Anne Case, Disaggregating Gender from Sex and Sexual Orientation: The Effeminate Man
in the Law and Feminist Jurisprudence, 105 YALE L.J. 1, 4 (1995) (arguing that Title VII, correctly applied,
protects the effeminate men).
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because the statute only prohibits discrimination "because of such individual's
sex" rather than discrimination "because of such individual's sexual orientation"
or "because of such individual's sexuality.' 4° Under this logic, Title VII does not
prohibit employers from firing employees because they are gay, even though
dismissals certainly affect the "terms and conditions" of employment. Similarly,
courts have held that Title VII does not prohibit a supervisor from sexually
harassing employees because they are gay, even though the harassment may
affect their employment.41
However, even if one takes this approach to interpreting Title VII, courts
must still determine whether the harassment happened "because of such
individual's sex." The fact that a plaintiff is gay does not relieve the factfinder of
determining whether the harassment happened "because of such individual's
sex," because there is nothing about one's sexual orientation that necessarily
prevents a claim of sex discrimination.
The easiest example demonstrating this point involves a heterosexual man
sexually harassing a lesbian. In such cases, the harassment might still be
motivated sexual attraction, gender animus or a gender stereotype. Imagine, for
example, a heterosexual employer threatening a gay female employee, "Sleep
with me or you're fired." This threat could be motivated in part by the woman's
sexual orientation. Yet, it is also clear that such a threat would not be made if the
employee were a man and Title VII would prohibit such behavior.
42
Title VII's focus remains whether the employee would have been treated the
same if he or she had been the opposite sex. This point raises a problem in
arguing that Title VII does not prohibit discrimination against gay men and
lesbians because sexual orientation is defined by reference to an individual's
40. E.g., DeSantis v. Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co., 608 F.2d 327, 329-330 (9th Cir. 1979); Higgins v. New
Balance Athletic Shoe, Inc., 21 F Supp. 2d 66 (D. Me. 1998) (holding that harassment that happens because of
animus toward plaintiff's sexual orientation is not "because of sex" and plaintiff must offer evidence to show
harassment was sex-based under Oncale); see also Chrouser v. DePaul Univ., No. 95 C 7363, 1998 WL 299426
(N.D. Ill. May 20, 1998); Brennan v. Metropolitan Opera Ass'n, No. 95 CIV. 2926 (MBM), 1998 WL 193204
(S.D.N.Y. April 22, 1998); Crawford v. Bank of Am., 181 F.R.D. 363 (N.D. I11. 1998).
41. E.g., DeSantis, 608 F.2d at 329-30.
42. One might argue that the claim is not actionable because the harassment happened in part "because
of' the woman's sexual orientation. However, courts rejected this line of reasoning when they first recognized
claims of sexual harassment under Title VII. See, e.g., Barnes v. Train, 13 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 123
(D.D.C. 1974), rev'd sub nom. Bames v. Costle, 561 F.2d 983, 990 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (court of appeals
overturning district court's decision that plaintiff had no cause of action because she "was discriminated
against, not because she was a woman, but because she refused to engage in a sexual affair with her
supervisor"); Tomkins v. Pub. Serv. Elec. & Gas Co., 422 F. Supp. 553, 556-57 (D.N.J. 1976) ("It is clear that
such a [sexual harassment] claim is simply without the scope of [Title VII]. The abuse of authority by
supervisors of either sex for personal purposes is an unhappy and recurrent feature of our social experience.
Such conduct is frequently illegal under the penal statutes of the relevant jurisdiction. Such conduct might well
give rise to a civil action in tort. It is not, however, sex discrimination within the meaning of Title VII even
when the purpose is sexual."), rev'd, 568 F.2d 1044 (3d Cir. 1977). In overruling the district court, the courts of
appeal maintained that, while other factors may have "caused" the harassment, the central question is whether
the plaintiffs would have been treated differently but for their sex. E.g., 568 F.2d at 1047.
To continue the example, one can imagine an animus towards women in the workplace motivating an
employer to create a hostile work environment that would be aimed at all women regardless of their sexual
orientation. Such behavior would be illegal if it affected the terms and conditions of the employment, regardless
of the sexual orientation-or any other characteristic----of the female employee.
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biological sex. For example, firing a male employee because he has intimate or
sexual relationships with men would not be taken against a similarly situated
female employee who had sexual relationships with men.43 "But for" his
biological sex, the employer would not find his sexual or intimate relationships
with men offensive.44
Despite the persuasiveness of this argument, and the fact that it is consistent
with current discrimination law, 45 lower courts have rejected this argument.46
Courts have instead held that gay men and women must prove they were treated
differently than someone of the opposite sex who was also gay.47 For instance, a
gay man must prove that a lesbian would have been treated differently.
48
This position has been well critiqued and this article does not take up those
49
arguments. Instead, it assumes this holding, while emphasizing that this
position still recognizes that Title VII protects gay men and lesbians. This is
43. Andrew Koppelman, Why Discrimination Against Lesbians and Gay Men Is Sex Discrimination, 69
N.Y.U. L. REV. 197, 208 (1994); Samuel A. Marcosson, Harassment on the Basis of Sexual Orientation: A
Claim of Sex Discrimination Under Ttie VII, 81 GEO. L.J. 1, 4-5 (1992).
44. Discrimination against gay men and lesbians easily fits the "but for" definition of sex discrimination
because in the United States a heterosexual is defined as someone who sexually prefers people of the opposite
sex and a homosexual is defined as someone who prefers people of the same sex. These definitions, however,
are not universally accepted. In Latin America, "homosexual" refers only to a man who takes the passive role,
letting himself be penetrated. In contrast, "heterosexual" refers to a man who takes the active role, with either
women or men, and usually acts macho. Snow Whites and Snake Charmers, ECONOMIST, Dec. 18-30, 1999, at
82 (discussing the definition and meaning of heterosexual and homosexual in traditional Latin America).
45. For example, in Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321 (1977), the Supreme Court heard a case in
which prisons required guards to be the same sex as inmates. The Court held that this "explicitly discriminates
against women on the basis of their sex." Id. at 332. Moreover, the policy discriminated against the employees
because of their sex, even though "[b]y its terms [the law] applies to contact positions in both male and female
institutions." Id. at 332 n.16. The fact that the law applied "equally" to men and women (for example, men
could not serve in female prisons) did not shield it from a claim of discrimination. Simply put, the policy was
discriminatory because "but for" their sex, women could serve as prison guards in the male prison. The Court,
however, held that the policy was legal because, while constituting sex discrimination, it qualified as bona fide
occupational qualification under 703(e) of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e) (1994). Id. at 336-337.
This analysis of "same-sex" policies qualifying as sex discrimination applies in other areas as well, such
as nursing homes and dormitories. E.g., Jones v. Hinds Gen. Hosp., 666 F. Supp. 933 (S..D. Miss. 1987)
(nursing homes); AFSCME v. Mich. Council, 635 F. Supp. 1010 (E..D. Mich. 1986) (nursing homes);
Hemandez v. Univ. of St. Thomas, 793 F. Supp. 214 (D. Minn. 1992) (dormitory custodians). In each, the court
found that the "same-sex" discrimination was sex discrimination; the only issue was whether it qualified for the
BFOQ exception. For background and a recent analysis of case law on sex discriminatory policies and the
"privacy BFOQ", see Jillian B. Berman, Comment, Defining the "Essence of the Business": An Analysis of
7itle VII Privacy BFOQ after Johnson Controls, 67 U. CHI. L. REv. 749, 752-762 (2000).
Outside the Title VII context, state courts have begun to recognize that prohibiting homosexual men and
lesbians from marrying also qualifies as sex discrimination, and thus the prohibition is subject to heightened
scrutiny under the state constitution. Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44 (Haw. 1993) (plurality opinion); Brause v.
Bureau of Vital Statistics, No. 3AN-95-6562 CI, 1998 WL 88743 at *6 (Alaska Super. Feb. 27, 1998) ("That
this is a sex-based classification can readily be demonstrated ... if twins, one male and one female, both
wished to many a woman and otherwise met all of the [state's] requirements, only gender prevents the twin
sister from marrying under the present law. Sex-based classification can hardly be more obvious.").
46. E.g., DeSantis v. Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co., 608 F.2d 327 (9th Cir. 1979).
47. E.g., Dillon v. Frank, 952 F.2d 403 (6th Cir. 1992) (arguing that the plaintiff failed to prove
"discrimination because of sex" because "he has not argued that a lesbian would have been accepted at the
Center... Without such a showing, his claim to have been discriminated against because he is male cannot
succeed.").
48. Id.
49. Koppelman, supra note 43; Marcosson, supra note 43.
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important because in the upcoming years courts will have to fashion a doctrine
that treats this test seriously. It is to that question that this article now turns.
II. PROHIBITING SEXUAL HARASSMENT AS A RULE OF ADJUDICATION
Prohibiting sexual harassment, as such, has operated as a bright-line rule for
judges and juries to apply to Title VII cases. In the context of male-female
harassment, courts have held employers liable if the factfinder found that the
employee was harassed in a way that (1) affected the "terms and conditions" of
the employment and (2) was "sexual in nature.' 5° There has generally been no
inquiry into whether the sexual harassment happened "because of such
individual's sex."51 A major criticism of this doctrine is that it operates as an
exception to Title VII.52 Commentators have argued that courts have not treated
Title VII's discrimination element seriously but avoided the "because of such
individual's sex" question by holding that sexual harassment, as such, is
prohibited.
One can view the choice between prohibiting sexual harassment per se or
only sexual harassment that happens "because of such individual's sex" as a
dispute over whether to adopt a general rule to decide individual cases or to take
a more rule-free, case-by-case approach-a debate that takes place in every area
of law.53 On the one hand, there is the argument that courts should simply
prohibit all sexual harassment. On the other hand, there is the argument that
courts should make more individualized judgments, prohibiting only sexual
harassment that qualifies as sex discrimination. As this part shows, framing the
debate this way refines the arguments for and against prohibiting sexual
harassment under Title VII.
This part proceeds in three sections. The first section begins with the stylized
notion that people often adopt rules because they minimize the sum of error
costs and decision costs. One can apply this model to a variety of contexts,
including the way judges decide cases. The second section builds on this concept
by discussing the fact that other values influence judges' decisions. For example,
the legal system also seeks to increase predictability for those affected by the
law. This section uses the paradigmatic example of a heterosexual man sexually
harassing a heterosexual woman to show why courts should prohibit sexual
harassment, while recognizing that the same arguments apply to prohibiting the
sexual harassment of heterosexual men, lesbians and gay men. The third section
argues that if courts continue to extend such categorical protection to women-
as they already have-then, for constitutional reasons of equal protection, they
must extend it to all plaintiffs regardless of their sex or sexual orientation.
50. See supra note 7 (discussing courts' standard approach to deciding sexual harassment cases in the
male-female context).
51. See supra note 7.
52. Willbom, supra note 4, at 677.
53. See Cass R. Sunstein, Problems with Rules, 83 CALIF. L. REv. 953, 957 (1995).
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A. Examining the "Error" Costs and "Decision" Costs
It is a conventional idea that people try to make good decisions at low costs
and in such a way that maximizes the net benefit of the decision. 54 In all walks of
life, people want to make the best choice, but they also do not want to spend too
much time and effort deciding.55 As a result, people adopt various strategies to
help them make decisions. For example, people often apply a "rule of thumb" or
a presumption to make a decision. Even though such strategies will err on
particular occasions, one of their central virtues is they lower the costs of making
the decision.
One can apply this conception of decision-making across many settings.
Briefly consider how people decide whom to vote for or how schools decide
which students to admit. Some people vote Democrat "across the board" and
many law schools use a "GPA-LSAT" formula to admit or reject students. Of
course, such strategies make mistakes, but they also significantly lower the costs
of making the decision.
Judges are in the business of making decisions, and one can frame their
decisions in these terms. That is, judges also attempt to make "good decisions" at
"low costs" and this may involve adopting rules or irrebutable presumptions to
decide individual cases. Indeed, one can find judges adopting rules in all areas of
law.
56
It is important to note, though, that one cannot argue for the adoption of
rules, or any other decision strategy, in the abstract. General rules can produce
enormous costs for few benefits or few costs for large benefits; at some level one
must be weighed against the other. For example, good doctors typically do not
use rigid rules to treat patients, in part because the cost of making an error (e.g.,
misdiagnosis) is high.57 In other contexts, rules are more acceptable.
Bureaucracies-reviled for their rigidity-often adopt rules because they must
repeatedly make similar decisions. The cumulative cost of deciding on an
individual level would be too high. The arguments for adopting a rule will
depend on the context and rest on the costs and benefits of that approach.
1. Error Costs
What does it mean for a judge to make a "good" or "bad" decision in the
context of Title VII? For those who argue that Title VII's crucial inquiry is
whether an employer treated members of one sex differently from members of
54. E.g., GARY BECKER, ACCOUNTING FOR TASTES (1996).
55. See George J. Stigler, The Economics ofInformation, 69 J. POL. ECON. 213 (1961) (arguing that
every decision-maker must recognize the point at which information-gathering should stop and a decision
should be made).
56. Sunstein, supra note 53, at 1023 (outlining the wide-range of rles adopted in the law).
57. See KATHRYN M. HUNTER, DOCTORS' STORIES: THE NARRATIVE STRUCTURE OF MEDICAL
KNOWLEDGE (1991).
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the other sex, a judge who holds an employer liable makes a "good decision" if,
in fact, the employee would not have suffered the adverse employment action
"but for" his or her sex. In contrast, the judge errs if the employer is held liable
and the adverse employment decision did not turn on the employee's sex but
happened "because of' something else.
One can certainly contest this definition of error because it relies on a
normative theory of interpreting Title VII. Specifically, it interprets "because of
such individual's sex" to mean the differential treatment of men and women.
Indeed, this is precisely where the debate over sexual harassment has been
focused. Those theories that argue that sexual harassment is "a form" of sex
discrimination are, in essence, arguing that courts do not err by prohibiting it.
58
Nonetheless, it should be recognized that this article assumes sex discrimination
means "treating men and women differently." Once one adopts this definition,
then one can determine when a decision errs.
The framework outlined above helps explain the error in prohibiting all
sexual harassment. This approach yields the correct result when individual cases
of sexual harassment are motivated by sexual desire, gender animus or gender
stereotypes but errs to the degree that other reasons motivate such behavior. This
points us towards an important factual question: How many cases of sexual
harassment happen "because of such individual's sex" and how many happen for
another reason?
For several reasons, existing studies on sexual harassment are severely
limited in the help they provide to answer this question.59 First, the majority of
studies have focused on the sexual harassment of women by men.6° Thus, it is
hard to make comparative statements. Second, existing studies have been
conducted from a social science perspective rather than a legal one. One problem
with this is that one cannot always conclude that what qualifies as "sexual
harassment" in a study meets the legal definition. For example, the behavior
categorized as sexual harassment might not be "severe or pervasive" enough to
alter the terms and conditions of the employment. 61 Third, such studies have
mostly concentrated on the victims of sexual harassment and the effects of the
62harassment, rather than on the perpetrator. No study has examined the sexual
orientation of those who harass or the motivations behind their behavior. Nor has
any study detailed the sexual orientation of both the harasser and the victim at
the same time.
58. See supra note 2.
59. For a brief summary of existing literature, see Waldo et al., supra note 38, at 60. For a more
extensive summary, see William E. Foote & Jane Goodman-Delahunty, Same-Sex Harassment: Implications of
the Oncale Decision for Forensic Evaluation of Plaintiffs, 17 BEHAV. Sa. & L. 123 (1999).
60. See Waldo et al., supra note 38, at 60 ("Most research has examined the sexual harassment of women
by men, reflecting the overwhelming majority of actual experiences.").
61. Likewise, some studies label behavior as "sexual harassment" but do not differentiate between sexual
and non-sexual conduct. E.g., Waldo et al., supra note 38. From a legal perspective, this difference is critical.
See supra note 23 (providing EEOC's definition of sexual harassment).
62. For example, studies focus on the impact of the sexual harassment or the number of cases in a given
population. See Appendix A for a summary of the studies.
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Nonetheless, three general points emerge from existing research and each
challenges conventional assumptions about sexual harassment. The first point is
that a substantial proportion of men have been sexually harassed at work. A
recent study indicates that almost half of men have been harassed at work in
some way.63 For example, in one study 29% of men reported experiencing
unwanted sexual attention and 44.1% experienced "lewd and offensive"
comments. Significantly, men are most often harassed by other men.64 Such facts
are important because they undermine the assumption that when a man sexually
harasses a woman it happens "because of her sex." Hence, one could argue that
sexual harassment in the male-female context does not always qualify as sex
discrimination.
The facts of Oncale help demonstrate this. It is conceivable that the men on
the oil rig sexually harassed Joseph Oncale for reasons unrelated to his sex; that
is, one can imagine he still would have been sexually harassed if he had been
female. For those who interpret Title VII to mean that men and women must be
treated the same at work, this conclusion is akin to saying that the men harassed
Oncale "because of' something besides his sex. To borrow from a Justice's
question in Oncale's oral argument, one can imagine that the men sexually
harassed him because he was a "fat slob" or had "crooked eyes.' '65 Under this
logic, the employer should not be held liable.
But an often-missed point in this argument is that a similarly situated
woman-a woman who was also "a fat slob" or had "crooked eyes"-would not
have been sexually harassed "because of her sex" either. Thus, a woman in
Joseph Oncale's place would not have a claim either. In short, the fact that men
sexually harass other men in substantial numbers weighs against the assumption
that men always sexually harass women "because of their sex." In this light, it is
quite striking that courts have presumed that all sexual harassment aimed at
women would not have happened if they were men.
The second point is that a substantial proportion of sexual harassment aimed
at men may still qualify as sex discrimination. For example, recent research
indicates that perhaps as much as 11% of men in the workforce are harassed for
reasons related to gender stereotypes. 66 Again, the harassment is most often by
other men. For example, men harass other men if they do traditionally female
67
activities such as housework or leaving work for child care. Such evidence
63. Waldo et al., supra note 38, at 68.
64. Id. at 69.
65. Transcript of Oral Argument at 13, Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., 523 U.S. 75 (1998) (No.
96-568), available in 1997 WL 751912 (Dec. 3, 1997) (asking, "Suppose he had been hazed in some other
fashion. I mean, just as obnoxious, but just not-you know, nothing to do with genitals or anything else. They
just said, you know, you're a fat slob. Your eyes are crooked. And, you know, they just made life miserable.
The same, but-just as obnoxious.").
66. Waldo et al., supra note 38, at 72; see also U.S. MERIT SYS. PROT. BD., SEXUAL HARASSMENT IN THE
FEDERAL WORKPLACE: TRENDS, PROGRESS, CONTINUING CHALLENGES 14 (1994) (stating that 14% of men
reported experiencing "unwanted sexual behavior" in the previous two years and 35% of the harassers were
men).
67. Waldo et al., supra note 37, at 68.
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supports the conclusion that some men, perhaps a substantial number, are
sexually harassed "because of their sex."
The third point challenges the assumption that harassment aimed at a gay
man would have also been aimed at him if he were a lesbian and vice versa. A
number of studies indicate that there are gender differences in rates of
68victimization against gay men and lesbians. On the whole, gay men experience
greater levels of anti-gay verbal harassment, threats, victimization and most
types of physical violence and intimidation.69 Most important, gay men
generally experience greater levels of violent sexual harassment than lesbians.
70
While this point is tenuous, it indicates that in some cases gay men would not be
sexually harassed if they were lesbians. Indeed, it is conceivable that some men
feel more threatened by gay men than by lesbians; gay men may pose more of a
challenge to those men's self-concept of masculinity than do lesbians. 71 In that
case, harassment of gay men qualifies as sex discrimination under the test given
by a majority of courts: If they were lesbians, they would not be harassed.
Moreover, there is no reason to think that a person's sexual orientation is the
only motive for harassment in every case. Consider the research that shows gay
men who describe themselves as "feminine" are twice as likely as other gay men
to have experienced "gay bashing., 72 This indicates that gay men are not
necessarily sexually harassed "because of' their sexual orientation but because
of the gender stereotype that men should not act feminine. At the same time, one
might reasonably conclude that lesbians face harassment from men motivated by
different reasons, such as sexual attraction and gender animus. 3 When that is the
case, they should have a claim also. The simple point is that a court adjudicating
Title VII claims cannot simply conclude that harassment aimed at gay men and
lesbians can never qualify as "sex discrimination" under current law. Rather, a
court's duty in adjudicating such cases is more complicated and subtle than case
law currently reflects.
To be clear, these points are rather rough generalizations at best. They do not,
by themselves, compel the conclusion that courts should prohibit all sexual
harassment, and they leave many questions unanswered. Nonetheless, the claim
68. Kevin Berrili, Anti-Gay Violence and Victimization in the United States: An Overview, in HATE
CRIMES, CONFRONTING VIOLENCE AGAINST LESBIANS AND GAY MEN 19, 25 (Gregory M. Herek & Kevin T.
Berrill eds., 1992).
69. Id.
70. Kevin T. Berrill, Anti-Gay Violence and Victimization in the United States: An Overview, 5 J.
INTERPERSONAL VIOLENCE, 274, 280 (1990); Kevin T. Berrill, supra note 68, at 19-46.
71. BENJAMIN B. WOLMAN & JOHN MONEY, HANDBOOK OF HUMAN SEXUALITY 305 (1993) (discussing
the "overwhelming anxiety" heterosexual men may feel when placed in a situation that causes them to question
their own heterosexuality, such as being confronted by a gay man). This is in fact frequently asserted by
heterosexual men who kill gay men. MICHAEL SCARCE, MALE ON MALE RAPE: THE HIDDEN TOLL OF STIGMA
AND SHAME 212-13 (1997) (discussing the common assertion of heterosexual men who kill gay men that the
victim made a homosexual advance at them, sending them into a "homosexual panic" during which the victim
was killed).
72. Deaux & LaFrance, supra note 19, at 793.
73. Beatrice von Schulthess, Violence in the Streets: Anti-Lesbian Assault and Harassment in San
Francisco, in HATE CRIMES, CONFRONTING VIOLENCE AGAINST LESBIANS AND GAY MEN, supra note 68, at 70.
(stating that attacks on lesbians often began as anti-woman and then have an added anti-lesbian dimension).
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is that any court using this interpretation-that Title VII prohibits differential
treatment of men and women-should be concerned about how many cases of
sexual harassment are motivated "because of such individual's sex" and how
many are motivated by other reasons. Moreover, the existing empirical research
on sexual harassment should at least serve as a background for the courts'
opinions and the debate over sexual harassment.
From these general points, two conclusions follow. First, the most one can
say is that in every variation of sexual harassment, some-but not all-of it
qualifies as sexual discrimination under the "but for" approach. For example,
current research cannot support the assumption that all or almost all the sexual
harassment of women by men happens "because of their sex." Thus, prohibiting
all sexual harassment, even in the paradigmatic case of harassment, sweeps too
broadly. At the same time, it is incorrect to conclude that same-sex sexual
harassment or the sexual harassment of gay men and women cannot qualify as
sex discrimination.
The second conclusion is that studies focusing on sexual harassment from a
legal perspective would improve the current debate significantly. Such studies
should also concentrate on giving a more detailed account of the sexual
orientation and sex of the perpetrators and victims. Most important, the studies
should focus on harassers' motivations and whether they would have treated a
similar person of the opposite sex differently.
2. Decision Costs
A major reason for courts to prohibit all sexual harassment is that it is much
easier-or less costly in terms of time and effort-to determine whether a
plaintiff has been sexually harassed than to separate out those cases that happen
"because of such individual's sex" from those that happen for other reasons.
Consider the following example:
James River Corporation hired Ann Goluzsek as a mechanic.
She had never married, nor lived anywhere but her mother's home.
According to Goluszek's psychiatrist, she had an "unsophisticated
background" and led an "isolated existence" with "little or no
sexual experience." She also "blushed easily" and was sensitive to
comments pertaining to sex.
Shortly after Goluzsek started working, a number of machine
operators asked her why she was not married, and joked that
employees had to be married to work there. They also told her to
go out with certain coworkers, because they would "fuck" her.
When she had trouble fixing a machine, the same operators said
they would call her "daddy" to help, referring to the supervisor. On
a number of occasions, while Goluzsek worked on a ladder,
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employees driving forklifts threatened to knock her off. When a
supervisor reprimanded Goluzsek for poor performance, she
requested a meeting with the plant manager. She complained about
both the manager and the danger the forklift drivers presented to
her.
When the company transferred Goluzsek to the night shift,
her co-workers repeatedly asked her if she had gotten any "pussy"
or had oral sex, showed her pictures of nude women, told her they
would get her "fucked," and accused her of being gay or bisexual.
The employers also poked her in the buttocks with a stick and
talked to her about "butt fucking" in the ass. The behavior
continued, and Goluzsek eventually filed a complaint.
74
The costs of deciding sexual harassment cases involve both the costs of
deciding the individual case and the cumulative cost of deciding the class of
cases. On the individual level, the costs of determining whether this harassment
happened because of Goluszek's sex or because of some other reason could be
quite significant. Based on these facts, one could argue that the harassment was
motivated by gender animus, sexual attraction or a gender stereotype. However,
one could also argue that the harassment happened because the victim was
unusually shy, was sexually inexperienced, lived with her mother, came from an
unsophisticated background or complained about the manager. Determining the
true motivation would not be a simple matter.
One must also consider the incentives a case-by-case approach would give to
the litigants. Once in court, the threat of losing the lawsuit gives defendants an
incentive to argue that the harassment took place for any reason other than the
plaintiff's sex. One can imagine defendants raising innumerable defenses in the
hypothetical above (e.g., she was harassed not "because of' her sex, but because
she was unusually shy, sexually inexperienced, etc.). Even in the most
meritorious claims, litigating the issue would take a good amount of time and
energy.
At the same time, the costs to a court would be cumulative. Given that
decision-makers are more likely to adopt rules if they must make many similar
decisions,75 it is significant that courts, as well as others in the legal system, must
frequently decide sexual harassment cases. For example, the EEOC, the
government agency charged with enforcing Title VII, 76 has received around
15,500 complaints a year for several years now, 50% more than the number
74. This hypothetical generally follows the facts of Goluszek v. Smith, 697 F. Supp. 1452 (N.D. Il.
1988), in which the plaintiff was male.
75. Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards: An Economic Analysis, 42 DUKE L.J. 557, 563 (1992);
Sunstein, supra note 53, at 1015 ("When numerous decisions of the same general class must be made, the
inaccurate fit of a rule becomes far more tolerable.").
76. 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(a) (1997).
2000]
Yale Journal of Law and Feminism
decided in 1992. 77 Just as important is the increase in cases in which the EEOC
has found reasonable cause for viable claims of sexual harassment. In 1992, the
EEOC issued 285 reasonable cause determinations, or 3.8% of the total charges
filed. In 1999, it issued 1,180 reasonable cause determinations, or 7.1% of the
total charges filed.78 As one commentator noted, "Sexual harassment law is
booming .... In coming years, harassment litigation will occupy more and more
attention from courts and employers.,
79
The clear advantage of prohibiting all sexual harassment is it substantially
lowers the costs of adjudication. Courts simply need to decide whether
something qualifies as "sexual harassment" and if it affected the terms and
conditions of employment instead of attempting to separate out those cases that
were motivated by the litigant's sex from those that were motivated by other
reasons. Although one cannot easily quantify how much this lowers the cost of
making such decisions, it does appear significant. In this way, one can
understand why courts have not engaged in a case-by-case analysis of causation
for the last decade when men have sexually harassed women.80
B. Other Values Promoted by a Per Se Rule
Thus far, the article's argument is simple: Prohibiting all harassment
involving sexual conduct is overinclusive but it significantly lowers the costs of
adjudicating cases. This section points to two other values served by bright-line
rules. First, they reduces arbitrary and biased decision-making. Second, rules
promote more predictable outcomes for those affected by the law. Rules have
these virtues because, by definition, they attempt to make the necessary
judgments in advance of the actual cases. 8
Again, reconsider the Goluzsek hypothetical presented above. Did the men
sexually harass her "because of her sex" or "because of' some other reason such
as the fact that she was not married, had little sexual experience, and lived with
her mother? Would they have treated her the same if she had been a man? It is
very difficult to answer these questions accurately in each case. The problem is
not that one cannot imagine examples in which the harassment was motivated by
reasons other than the person's sex. The problem is that in the real world one
cannot separate those cases from those that were motivated by the employee's
sex in a precise way.
77. EEOC, Sexual Harassment Statistics FY 1992-FY 1999, at http://vtwweeoc.gov/stats/harass.html
(last visited January 15, 2001) (reporting that in 1992, 10,532 filings were made with the EEOC, compared to
15,222 filings in 1999.).
78. Id.
79. Mark M. Hager, Harassment and Constitutional Tort: The Other Jurisprudence, 16 HOFSTRA LAs. &
EMP. L.J. 279, 279 (1999).
80. See supra note 7 (describing courts' per se prohibition of sexual harassment).
81. See Sunstein, supra note 53, at 961 ("Rules are largely defined by the ex ante character of law. By the
aspiration to a system of rules, I therefore mean to refer to something very simple: approaches to law that try to
make most or nearly all legal judgments under the governing legal provision in advance of actual cases.").
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A case-by-case or more rule-free approach increases the chances that the
82case will turn on arbitrary factors. In cases like the hypothetical, any decision
will reflect a good amount of guesswork as to whether the harassment qualified
as sex discrimination. At worst, such decisions would be biased against
particular litigants. For example, litigants might lose because they are in some
way not normal (e.g., "abnormally shy"). An advantage to prohibiting sexual
harassment is this approach treats claims of sexual harassment the same because
the case depends only on whether the alleged behavior qualifies as sexual
harassment. In this way, prohibiting sexual harassment acts impartially by
focusing on the conduct alone.
Prohibiting all sexual harassment also increases the predictability covered by
the law. Employees and employers must deal with many of the same problems
judges face. They must decide whether an employee has violated the law and
design procedures to handle problems that arise. Without a rule-like approach, it
will frequently be unclear whether the employer has violated the law or-more
precisely-whether a court would hold an employer liable for certain behavior.
Given that it is often more important to know what the law is than to have a
particular law, prohibiting all sexual harassment is preferable to a case-by-case
approach.83 In sum, it would give employees and employers a better sense of
what the law prohibits in the workplace.
C. Equal Protection: Tying it together
There is another, perhaps more important, reason why courts should use a
conduct-based approach: It avoids violating the Constitution's mandate of equal
protection. Under the Fourteenth Amendment, the government-which includes
federal courts 4-- may not deny "any person... equal protection of the laws. 85
As it applies to sexual harassment doctrine, this raises two problems for courts if
they distinguish between plaintiffs based on their sex or sexual orientation.
The first problem is that the Fourteenth Amendment, as interpreted by the
Supreme Court, requires government actors to treat men and women the same
unless "an exceedingly persuasive" justification for the differential treatment can
82. Id. at 974.
83. See Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U. CHI. L. REv. 1175, 1179 (1989). ("As
laws have become more numerous, and as people have become increasingly ready to punish their adversaries in
the courts, we can less and less afford protracted uncertainty regarding what the law may mean. Predictability,
or as Llewellyn put it, 'reckonability,' is a needful characteristic of any law worthy of the name. There are times
when even a bad rule is better than no rule at all.").
84. Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429 (1984) (court's child custody order subject to demands of Fourteenth
Amendment); New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964) (judicial enforcement of an individual's
defamation claim held subject to the Fourteenth Amendment and, through it, the First Amendment); Moose
Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163, 179 (1972) ("State action... may emanate from rulings of administrative
and regulatory agencies as well as from legislative or judicial action."); see also J. NOWAK & R. ROTUNDA,
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 452 (1991) ("When a legislature, executive officer, or court takes some official action
against an individual, that action is subjected to review under the Constitution, for the official act of any
governmental agency is direct governmental action and therefore subject to the restraints of the Constitution.").
85. U.S. CONST. amend. XIW, § 1.
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be provided.86 As a result, courts must generally interpret statutes in such a way
that men and women are accorded similar relief. Unless courts can meet this
burden, they may not interpret Title VII to prohibit the sexual harassment of
women at work under Title VII without also prohibiting the same conduct aimed
at men.
Under the facts of the Goluzsek hypothetical above, a female plaintiff would
have a claim if the harassment affected the terms and conditions of work. Courts
would presume that conduct happened "because of her sex.', 87 Once courts
extend this presumption to women who are sexually harassed, however, the
Constitution requires that they extend the presumption to men. This is
particularly true because some men and women will be similarly situated with
regard to the discriminatory motive.88 For example, regardless of the victim's
sex, the harassment might be motivated by gender stereotypes-in which case
both men and women should have a claim. Likewise, men and women are
similarly situated whenever a motive other than their sex motivates the
harassment.
This is not to deny that women and men-as groups-may be differently
situated. Women may be sexually harassed much more often because of their sex
than are men. But the fact that women and men are on average different does not
allow the courts to treat all women and all men differently under current
doctrine. Even though significant differences may exist between men and
women as groups, the government must treat every individual the same
regardless of that person's sex. Under existing case law, the Constitution does
not allow courts to categorically assume that the certain types of harassment
happened "because of such individual's sex" when the plaintiff is a woman,
while requiring men in the same situation to prove it.
89
The second constitutional problem involves treating gay men and lesbians
differently than heterosexual men and women. Before analyzing that issue,
however, it is to important to underline a point that follows from the analysis
above: If courts presume that the sexual harassment of lesbians violates Title
VII, they must grant the same presumption to gay men. This is important
because in the vast majority of cases involving men sexually harassing women,
courts have not even inquired into the plaintiff's sexual orientation. Indeed,
under the future doctrine of sexual harassment sketched by the Supreme Court in
86. United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 532-33 (1996).
87. See Part III.A for a summary of current sexual harassment doctrine under Oncale.
88. See United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 520 (1996) (emphasizing that there was nothing about
military school that made it inherently unsuitable to women generally and that some women could perform well
under the school's "adversative" system); see also id. at 573 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing that under the
majority's test, one would have to find VMI's admissions policy unconstitutional if there existed "a single
woman... willing and able to undertake VMI's program").
89. See Wengler v. Druggists Mut. Ins. Co., 446 U.S. 142, 152-53 (1980) (holding that the state must
either grant assumption of proof to all males because they granted it to all females, or eliminate it for females
and take a case-by-case approach); see also Lehman, supra note 13, at 150.
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Oncale in 1998, the fact that a plaintiff is a lesbian plays no role in deciding
whether the employer violated Title VII. 90
However, this argument does not resolve whether a court could treat both
gay men and lesbians differently than heterosexual men and women. The answer
is ambiguous because equal protection doctrine as it applies to gay men and
lesbians has just begun to develop. The leading case is Romer v. Evans,91 the first
and only case in which the Supreme Court applied the Equal Protection Clause
to government action that discriminated against gay men and lesbians. In Romer,
the Court held that a Colorado constitutional amendment (Amendment 2)
prohibiting all action at any level of government to protect homosexuals from
sexual orientation discrimination violated the Fourteenth Amendment.
The Court gave two reasons for striking down Amendment 2. First, it held
that the amendment was "at once too narrow and too broad" because it
"identifies persons by a single trait and then denies them protection across the
board.",92 The amendment thus lacked an adequate connection between the
classification and any legitimate purpose. Second, the Court said "the
amendment seems inexplicable by anything but animus toward the class it
affects." 93 By making "a general announcement that gays and lesbians shall not
have any particular protections from the law, [it] inflicts on them immediate,
continuing, and real injuries that outrun and belie any legitimate justifications
that may be claimed for it."'94 Since Amendment 2 was far too broad to be
justified by reference to any of the state's purposes, it failed as "a status-based
enactment .... [I]t is a classification of persons undertaken for its own sake." 95
Of course, differences exist between Amendment 2 and courts' interpreting
Title VII so that gay men and lesbians are not granted a presumption of sex
discrimination when they are sexually harassed. The latter appears small in
scope when measured against a state constitutional amendment. Such an
interpretation would affect only the rights of gay men and lesbians under a
federal statute, might not be considered overly broad, and does not seem to be
based solely in animus or "divorced from any factual context." 96 Instead it seems
to reflect some notion that sexual harassment aimed at gay men and lesbians
qualifies less frequently as "discrimination because of such individual's sex"
than does sexual harassment aimed at heterosexual men and women.
Such an interpretation of Romer has problems, though. Romer itself avoided
any bold doctrinal or theoretical pronouncements. Thus, one could argue that the
decision represents more of the "floor" of the Equal Protection Clause and
demonstrates what is not acceptable, rather than a ceiling for what is. Moreover,
granting presumptions to heterosexual men and women still classifies plaintiffs
90. See Part III.A (summarizing current sexual harassment doctrine after Oncale).
91. 517 U.S. 620 (1996).
92. Id. at 633.
93. ld. at 632.
94. Id. at 635.
95. Id. at 635.
96. Id. at 635.
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by their sexual orientation and then affords them less protection if they are not
heterosexual. Although not done for "its own sake," it is still "a status-based
classification" that is especially noticeable because it would be the only
characteristic on which a presumption of discrimination would be denied. For
example, courts would not examine more closely whether a case really qualified
as sex discrimination if the person was unusually shy, a feminist, "a fat slob,"
unmarried or had any other characteristic that might motivate the harassment. In
this way, there is a sense in which treating people's Title VII rights differently
based on their sexual orientation reflects a broader societal prejudice, which by
itself could not serve as the sole basis for the differential treatment.
97
The best argument, however, is not that granting plaintiffs different
presumptions on the basis of their sexual orientation would be unconstitutional.
Reasonable arguments can be made either way under current doctrine. The best
argument is that courts are interpreting an act of Congress, and in so doing they
should avoid substantial constitutional questions, a familiar principle of
interpretation." It may, or may not, be constitutional for Congress to pass a
statute that treated gay men and lesbians differently by giving them higher
burdens of proof under Title VII. But courts should not interpret Title VII in a
way that raises constitutional issues unless Congress has clearly spoken on the
issue. 99
In sum, courts should utilize a conduct-based approach because, even though
it is overinclusive, it significantly lowers litigation costs, reduces arbitrary and
biased decisions and promotes predictability. Moreover, courts should not
distinguish between plaintiffs based on their sex or sexual orientation, because
even if not unconstitutional, such an interpretation raises serious constitutional
questions that courts should avoid.
I. WHEN CONDUCT PROVES CAUSATION: NEW DOCTRINE,
OLD DOCTRINE, SAME DOCTRINE
This part situates this article's argument into a broader judicial context. First,
it explains how this argument works under existing sexual harassment case law.
97. See id. at 634-35.
98. See Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. v. Fla. Gulf Coast Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council, 485 U.S. 568, 575
(1988) ("Where an otherwise acceptable construction of a statute would raise serious constitutional problems,
the Court will construe the statute to avoid such problems unless such construction is plainly contrary to the
intent of Congress."); see also Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116, 128-30 (1958) (construing statute to avoid
constitutional questions); NLRB v. Catholic Bishop, 440 U.S. 490, 500-01, 504-07 (1979) (same); Pub. Citizen
v. United States Dep't of Justice, 491 U.S. 440, 466 (1989) (describing the cannon of avoiding raising
constitutional issues as an "axiom of statutory interpretation").
99. One might also argue that courts should avoid the constitutional issue because the current test for
equal protection relies on the government's putting forth facts, to some degree, that show the classification has
a relationship to serving a legitimate interest. See Romer, 517 U.S. at 632. When compared to Congress,
however, courts are deficient in their ability to make such findings (e.g., courts cannot order an empirical study
to be performed). As the discussion in Part II on existing research demonstrates, there are many questions still
open as to how much harassment aimed at gay men and lesbians qualifies as sex discrimination. As a result, it
may be better for courts to be cautious and not classify plaintiffs by their sexual orientation.
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Second, it shows how this approach fits under the framework of Title VII.
Finally, it examines other areas in which courts must answer "because of' or
"but for" questions and shows that courts frequently use bright-line rules even
though they are overinclusive.
A. New Doctrine: Sexual harassment after Oncale
In Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services1°° the Supreme Court held that
Joseph Oncale was not barred, as a matter of law, from suing his employer for
sexual harassment because the harassers were also men. That is, plaintiffs may
sue for sexual harassment under Title VII regardless their sex. In dicta, the Court
very briefly outlined three evidentiary routes plaintiffs might take to prove Title
VII's causation requirement. 10 1 The first evidentiary route involves the trier of
fact inferring discrimination based on the sexual proposals and the harasser's
sexual orientation. For example, a female plaintiff might show that "explicit and
implicit proposals of sexual activity" were made by a heterosexual man.
Likewise, male plaintiffs may satisfy the requirement by proving the harasser is
homosexual.1
0 2
However, the Court stated that "harassing conduct need not be motivated by
sexual desire to support an inference of discrimination on the basis of sex,"
' 103
and thus other evidentiary routes were possible. To prove this point, the Court
gave a one-sentence example. "A trier of fact might reasonably find such
discrimination, for example, if a female victim is harassed in such sex-specific
and derogatory terms by another woman as to make it clear that the harasser is
motivated by general hostility to the presence of women in the workplace,"''
4
the Court explained. For this second evidentiary route, factfinders presumably
look at the conduct regardless of the harasser's sexual orientation. The Court
then concluded by stating a "plaintiff may also, of course, offer direct
comparative evidence about how the alleged harasser treated members of both
sexes in a mixed-sex workplace."'
0 5
This article's basic suggestion is that courts interpret the three evidentiary
routes to represent, respectively, the three types of harassment claims litigants
could bring before Oncale: quid pro quo, hostile work environment and non-
sexual harassment. Courts would thus take two crucial steps in every harassment
case. The first step would determine whether the harasser's conduct altered the
"terms and conditions" of work. 10 6 Under this analysis, the harassment would
100. 523 U.S. 75 (1998).
101. Id. at 80-81.
102. Id. at 80.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Id. at 80-81.
106. The unwelcomeness requirement that is part of the standard approach to sexual harassment, see
supra note 7, would presumably be considered in this step. See Reed v. Shepard, 939 F.2d 484, 491 (7th Cir.
1991) (considering the unwelcomeness requirement as part of the "affecting a term or condition" element of a
Title VII action in hostile environment cases).
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have to involve an tangible employment decision (e.g., demotion) or qualify as
"severe or pervasive" enough to create an objectively "abusive work
environment."'
07
The second step would focus on the issue of causation and depend on the
type of harassment alleged. In a quid pro quo claim, the court would determine
the sexual orientation of the harasser and whether sexual proposals were
implicitly or explicitly made (Oncale's first evidentiary route). 108 In a hostile
work environment claim, the court would determine whether the harassment
qualified as "sex-specific" (Oncale's second evidentiary route). This would
include conduct that was sexual and behavior that focused on the plaintiff's sex.
For example, a court should infer discrimination if the harasser repeatedly called
the plaintiff a "dumb woman.' 1 9 For constitutional reasons, the factfmder would
focus on the conduct alone and the claim would not turn on whether the plaintiff
was a man or woman, heterosexual or gay. If the claim did not involve sexual
proposals, sexual conduct or "sex-specific" conduct, then the court would
determine whether members of one sex were treated differently than members of
another (Oncale's third evidentiary route). For example, a court could infer
discrimination if a supervisor repeatedly berated the women for poor
performance but not the men, or if women alone were exposed to an abusive
environment.
This two-step approach-building directly on Oncale and prior case law-
uses a rule-like approach to adjudicate cases. That is, using the conduct of the
harassment to infer discrimination has the result of prohibiting categories of
behavior (e.g., all harassment that is sexual and creates a hostile work
environment is prohibited). Moreover, the analysis does not look at a wide range
of other factors that might be in some sense relevant, including the plaintiff's sex
107. The distinction between harassment that affects a tangible employment decision and harassment
that creates an abusive work environment is important for reasons of liability. In Burlington Industries v.
Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742 (1998), and Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775 (1998), the Court held that
liability turns on whether the victim has suffered a "tangible employment action," such as termination or the
loss of a promotion; if so, then the employer is automatically liable. If it involves an abusive environment, an
employer is liable unless it demonstrates that it "exercised reasonable care to prevent and correct promptly" the
harassment and that the employee unreasonably failed to avoid harm by complaining to her employer or taking
other appropriate actions. Faragher, 524 U.S. at 807.
108. In The Equal Protection Problem in Sexual Harassment Doctrine, I argue that this is the best way to
interpret Oncale for constitutional reasons. Lehman supra note 13, at 142-54. Oncale's first evidentiary route
raises an equal protection problem because it classifies plaintiffs by their sex and then treats them differently.
When heterosexual men create sexually hostile work environments, female plaintiffs have to prove only that
the harassment affected the "compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges" of employment to obtain a remedy.
Male plaintiffs in the same position-sexually harassed by heterosexual men-must meet a higher burden by
otherwise proving they were harassed "because of their sex." This differential treatment triggers constitutional
scrutiny because the government must treat men and women the same unless it can provide "an exceedingly
persuasive" justification for the differential treatment. The article argues that courts cannot justify treating men
and women's claims differently in every sexual harassment case. The solution, which remains consistent with
the language of Oncale, is for lower courts to rely on a plaintiff's sex and the harasser's sexual orientation only
in quid pro quo claims of sexual harassment. Id.
109. In this light, we can make some progress on one court's statement that, "It is one thing to call a
woman 'worthless,' and another to call her a 'worthless broad."' Steiner v. Showboat Operating Co., 25 F3d
1459, 1464 (9th Cir. 1994). Assuming that the harassment rose to a sufficiently high level, the difference may
not be in the motive of the harasser but in the virtues of drawing a bright-line rule based on conduct.
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or sexual orientation. As a result, this approach would be overinclusive because
it would sweep into its conduct that might not qualify as sex discrimination. The
virtues of the approach, however, should be apparent from the discussion above.
B. Old Doctrine: When impact proves causation under itle VII
Some scholars have derided sexual harassment as being "treated as an
exceptional and unique form of discrimination"' 1° because courts have paid little
attention to Title VII's "because of such individual's sex" element but simply
prohibited sexual harassment per se. The analysis thus far shows that this
criticism proves too much by itself because other reasons justify such an
approach. But this criticism is also inaccurate because it mischaracterizes Title
VII doctrine as a whole. Prohibiting sexual or sex-specific harassment-by
presuming discrimination from conduct alone-fits well within the larger
structure of Title VII analysis.
The Supreme Court has adopted two general theories of what constitutes
prohibited discrimination under Title VII: disparate treatment and disparate
impact. Disparate treatment is the "most easily understood type"' 11' because it
focuses on the employer's motive and proof of the employer's intent is critical.
In turn, disparate treatment may be analyzed at the group or individual level.
At the group level, for example, an employer could have a policy that only
women may work as nurses. Or, more commonly, the employer might have such
a policy informally that is revealed by a pattern or statistical evidence
demonstrating differential treatment. An individual plaintiff can also be the
victim of disparate treatment (or intentional discrimination). For instance, there
might be a prejudiced supervisor who-acting as the employer's agent-
believes that only women should be nurses and assigns only women to that job.
In such a case, there would be no policy (by definition) and thus no group or
systematic claim, but the individual would still have a claim. The focus remains
whether the supervisor acted with the intent to discriminate on an invidious
basis.
The second theory is disparate impact. As the Supreme Court has explained,
systemic (or group) disparate impact involves "practices that are facially neutral
in their treatment of different groups but that in fact fall more harshly on one
group than another and cannot be justified by business necessity.'" 2 The key
difference between disparate impact and disparate treatment is that the plaintiff
does not need to prove a discriminatory motive in the policy." 3 Under this
theory, for example, an employer can be held liable under Title VII solely for
hiring people based on minimum height and weight requirements. An employer
may even violate Title VII by relying on other more subjective criteria (e.g., only
110. Willborn, supra note 4, at 677.
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hiring "aggressive" employees) if it has a disparate impact on women and it is
not a business necessity."4
The legitimacy of this theory was often questioned before it was codified in
1991115 on the ground that Title VII for did not prohibit employers from
discriminating against people "because of' their height or anything except
certain invidious criteria such as race and sex.'16 For some this created a
"paradox" because it raised the question of how an employer who uses a neutral
criterion could be deemed to have made an employment decision that is based on
sex." t 7 Nonetheless, the Supreme Court accepted the disparate impact theory
under Title VH.
The important point for this article is that the claim that sexual harassment is
somehow "exceptional" because it ignores harasser's intent is wrong. Before
1991, courts ignored intent whenever they decided a disparate impact claim even
though the statute required "discrimination because of such individual's sex." A
prima facie claim was based on the impact of the policy alone.
Thus, there exists a clear parallel between the types of claims. In a
systematic disparate impact claim, the plaintiff does not need to demonstrate the
employer's motivation: The impact of the policy fulfills the "because of sex"
requirement. In an individual harassment claim, the plaintiff does not need to
demonstrate the harasser's motivation: The discrimination element is satisfied
with proof that the harassment was sexual or sex-specific. The following table
demonstrates their parallel structure:
114. Under the disparate impact theory, the Supreme Court developed a three-part analysis. Griggs v.
Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971). First, the plaintiff's prima facie case requires a showing that a facially
neutral employment practice has a disproportionately adverse impact on a protected class. Once that threshold
is reached, the burden of persuasion shifts to the employer to demonstrate that the challenged practice is job-
related and justifiable as a matter of business necessity. Finally, the plaintiff has an opportunity to prove that
there exists an alternative practice that would serve the employer's objectives equally well but have a less
severe adverse effect. Until Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642 (1989), the issue of business
necessity was an affirmative defense, rather than part of the plaintiff's case. In Wards Cove, the Court placed
the burden of proof on the plaintiff. Congress overturned this burden in 1991. See infra note 115.
115. Congress codified the disparate impact cause of action in the Civil Rights Act of 1991. See 42
U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(l)(A) (1994). The Act served to overrule some aspects of Wards Cove, in which the
Supreme Court had announced a series of changes in disparate impact doctrine. Most notable among these
pronouncements was a new rule that the issue of "business necessity" was not to be seen as an affirmative
defense but as part of the plaintiff's case, id. at 659-60, and a redefinition of the concept of business necessity
that was more a notion of reasonable justification than of necessity, id. at 659. In the 1991 Act, Congress made
it clear that the burden of persuasion on the question of business necessity rests on the employer, not the
plaintiff. Moreover, the Act reinstated judicial interpretations of "consistent with business necessity" and "job
relatedness" that predated Wards Cove.
The important point for this article, however, is not the contours of disparate impact analysis before or
after the 1991 Act. The important point is to notice is that impact alone-without proof of individual motive-
satisfied Title VII.
116. E.g., Earl M. Maltz, The Legacy of Griggs v. Duke Power Co.: A Case Study in the Impact of a
Modernist Statutory Precedent, 1994 UTAH L. REv. 1353 (1994) (characterizing the Griggs decision as an
example of the influence of independent, court-made policy judgments in statutory interpretation).
117. Steven L. willbom, The Disparate Impact Model of Discrimination and Limits, 34 AM. U. L. REV.
799, 803 (1985); see also Owen Fiss, A Theory of Fair Employment Laws, 38 U. CHI. L. REv. 235, 297 (1971)
("[H]ow can an employment decision based on the individual's nonperformance under a facially innocent
criterion be deemed to be an employment decision based on the individual's race?").
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Type of Claim Proving the "because of such individual's sex" element
Individualized Conduct alone proves element
inquiry into
motivation
Group Claim: Employer's policy: Employer's explicit policy:
discrimination motivation ignored if it has
proved by disparate impact






Individual Claim: Demonstrated by Motivation ignored if it is
1) Adverse differential 1) sexual conduct (Oncale's 1 st
Tangible treatment (Oncale's evidentiary route) 120
Employment 3d evidentiary 2) sex-specific (Oncale's 2nd




Although outside the scope of this article, one could argue that the systematic
disparate impact claims are justified by the same reasons advocated here.
Systematic disparate impact is certainly overinclusive if one reads the statute as
prohibiting intentional discrimination. Yet it simplifies the law's approach in
deciding cases and thus lowers decision costs, promotes equal treatment of
similar cases, and increases predictability for employers and employees.
C. Same Doctrine: When conduct proves causation outside discrimination law
In a number of areas of law outside discrimination law, courts must resolve
questions of causation. That is, they must determine whether something
happened "because of' something else. Generally, these areas require judges to
answer a "but for" question and proof of certain facts alone cannot satisfy this
element. However, in each area "exceptions" to this general approach exist. This
section provides thumbnail sketches of four diverse areas of law that require
118. The employer would be automatically liable if the harassment involves a "tangible employment
decision" under Burlington Indus. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742 (1998). See supra note 107.
119. The employer would be liable if the harassment creates an abusive environment unless he or she
demonstrates that he or she "exercised reasonable care to prevent and correct promptly" the harassment and
that the employee unreasonably failed to avoid harm by complaining to her employer or taking other
appropriate actions under Burlington, 524 U.S. 742 (1998). See supra note 107.
120. Oncale's first evidentiary route also looks at the sexual orientation of the harassers, and it should be
applied only to quid pro quo cases for constitutional reasons of equal protection. See supra note 108.
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judges to determine causation: common law negligence, the National Labor
Relations Act, SEC Rule 10(b)(5) and Sixth Amendment "Strickland'" rights. In
each, courts use presumptions or inferences based on a fact to fulfill the
causation element.
This section's goal, however, is not to detail or defend the merits of each area
of law. Many reasons support these positions and a discussion of them is outside
the scope of this article. Rather, this section's purpose is to demonstrate that it is
not extraordinary or exceptional for conduct to satisfy a causation requirement or
for courts simply to avoid an individualized inquiry altogether, even while
maintaining that as a general matter causation must be proved on case-by-case.
While such approaches are always overinclusive, they are still acceptable.
1. Common Law Negligence
Begin with the common law, which holds people liable for accidents that
happen "because of' their negligence. In general, courts do not hold defendants
liable for an accident or injury because accidents happen even when one is not
negligent. 121 Thus, courts have often said, "negligence must be proved, and
never will be presumed.
1 22
Despite such an emphatic statement, doctrinal exceptions exist. Under the
doctrine of res ipsa loquitur (meaning, it "speaks for itself'), courts find
defendants liable solely because it was a certain type of accident (e.g., the
explosion of a water heater, the falling of an elevator, etc.). 123 That is, courts
ignore whether in that individual case it happened "because of' negligence. This
approach rests on the acknowledgement that res ipsa loquitur sweeps too broadly
because it holds all defendants liable even though in many cases no one acted
negligently.
Courts also typically presume causation in product liability cases involving
the "failure to warn. 124 Thus, courts presume "that the consumer would have
read any warning provided by the manufacturer, and acted so as to minimize the
risks,''125 except in unusual cases. 126 This approach is flawed because a number
of consumers would have been undoubtedly injured even with the label. As a
result, the defendants are held liable for injuries that they did not cause. But by
assuming causation the court avoids the need to make particularized inquiry.
This "generalized" approach covering the whole class of cases is preferable




124. Robert N. Strassfeld, If... : Counterfactuals in the Law, 60 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 339, 359 (1992).
125. Reyes v. Wyeth Lab., 498 F.2d 1264, 1281 (5th Cir. 1974) (applying Texas law); see also Strassfeld,
supra note 124, at 359 n.99 (citing cases that apply presumption).
126. E.g., Thomas v. Bait. & O.R.R., 310 A.2d 186 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1973) (finding presumption
rebutted by evidence of plaintiff's knowledge of danger even in absence of warning signs).
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because it lowers decision costs, treats all the plaintiff equally and promotes
predictability for the companies and consumers.
2. Section 8(a)(3) of the NLRB
Section 8(a)(3) of the National Labor Relations Act makes it an unfair labor
practice for an employer "by discrimination in regard to hire or tenure of
employment or any term or condition of employment to encourage or discourage
membership in any labor organization." 127 The Supreme Court has held that
section 8(a)(3) requires an anti-union motive. 12 Thus, an "act is not by itself
unlawful unless intended to prejudice the employees' position because of their
membership in the union."
129
As one might expect, employers typically deny that an employee's protected
status played any role in their challenged behavior (i.e., dismissal).130 As a result,
the question for a court becomes one of motive: Did the employer act a certain
way because of an anti-union animus? 131 Of course, another way to put this is
whether the employer would have treated the plaintiff the same way if they were
not in a union. In general, if anti-union animus drives the decision, then the
employer has violated § 8(a)(3); if not, the behavior is lawful. 132 For example, it
is unlawful for an employer to fire a union leader to harm the union, but it is
completely lawful to dismiss a union leader because he violated shop rules.
33
The Supreme Court has carved out an exception to this rule, however. While
maintaining that motive is an element of § 8(a)(3), 134 the Court has held that
behavior which is "inherently discriminatory conduct" can violate § 8(a)(3)
without proof of unlawful motive. 135 For example, regardless of motive or even
an employer's need to maintain operations, it is unlawful under § 8(a)(3) for an
employer to offer super-seniority (e.g., an additional credit of twenty years'
seniority) to workers who replace striking employees or strikers who return to
work immediately. 136 Such conduct "speaks for itself ' 137 and is prohibited by §
8(a)(3).
127. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3) (2000).
128. See Radio Officers v. NLRB, 347 U.S. 17, 43 (1954) (holding employer's "real motive" is decisive
under section 8(a)(3)).
129. NLRB v. Brown, 380 U.S. 278,286 (1965).
130. Rebecca Hanner white, Modern Discrimination Theory and the National Labor Relations Act, 39
WM. & MARY L. REv. 99, 125-26 (1997).
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. American Shipbuilding Co. v. NLRB, 380 U.S. 300, 311 (1965).
134. NLRB v. Great Dane Trailers Inc., 388 U.S. 26, 33 (1967) ("The statutory language 'discrimination
... to ... discourage' means that the finding of a violation normally turns on whether the discriminatory
conduct was motivated by an anti-union purpose.").
135. See id; see also Barbara J. Fick, Inherently Discriminatory Conduct Revisited: Do We Know It
When We See It?, 8 HOFSTRA LAB. L.J. 275, 276 (1991).
136. NLRB v. Erie Resistor Corp., 373 U.S. 221,227-37 (1963).
137. Fick, supra note 135, at 275.
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3. SEC Rule 1Ob-5
The Securities and Exchange Commission's Rule lOb-5 prohibits fraudulent
conduct in connection with the purchase or sale of any security.'38 Under 1Ob-5,
a plaintiff may recover damages for a defendant's conduct provided that the
plaintiff can prove reliance on the defendant's misrepresentation or omission. In
this context, courts consider reliance a synonym for "but for" or "in fact"
causation. 139 Courts have held that such reliance is "a matter of individual
proof ' 140 that is established only if the evidence shows that the misrepresentation
was a substantial factor in determining the course of conduct that resulted in his
loss.141
The Supreme Court recognized the difficulty of proving reliance on the
nondisclosure of information in Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States. 142 Rather
than require an individual to prove that he or she would have acted otherwise
"but for" the non-disclosure, the Court ruled that the defendant's failure to
disclose material information establishes the requisite causation when there is a
duty to disclose (such as a fiduciary duty). 14 3 In short, the Court changed the
inquiry from "Would the plaintiff still have acted the same had the information
been disclosed?" to asking, "Was the information material enough to establish a
presumption of reliance?" While defendants technically have the ability to rebut
this presumption, it is virtually impossible to do this. 144 Thus, the Court has
created a de facto irrebuttable presumption of reliance in cases of nondisclosure.
4. Ineffective Counsel and Strickland v. Washington
In Strickland v. Washington,145 the Supreme Court established a two-part test
to evaluate criminal defendants' claims that their lawyer provided ineffective
assistance. First, the defendant must prove that his counsel's performance fell
below an objective standard of reasonableness. Second, the defendant must show
"a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result
of the proceeding would have been different." 146
138. 17 C.F.R § 240.10b-5 (2000). Rule lOb-5 is promulgated under the Securities Exchange Act of
1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2000).
139. See List v. Fashion Park, Inc., 340 F.2d 457, 462-63 (2d Cir. 1965) (The test of'reliance' is whether
"the misrepresentation is a substantial factor in determining the course of conduct which results in [the
recipient's] loss. The reason for this requirement... is to certify that the conduct of the defendant actually
caused the plaintiff's injury." (quoting RESTATEMENTOF TORTS § 546 (1938) (additional citations omitted))).
140. Huddleston v. Herman & MacLean, 640 F.2d 534, 549 (5th Cir. Unit A Mar. 1981); see also List,
340 F.2d at 462-63.
141. Huddleston, 640 F.2d at 549.
142. 406 U.S. 128 (1972).
143. Id. at 153-54.
144. Joseph De Simone, Should Fraud on the Market Theory Extend to the Context of Newly Issued
Securities?, 61 FORDHAM L. REv. 151, 166 (1993).
145. 466 U.S. 668 (1984).
146. Id. at 694 (emphasis added).
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Some circumstances constitute per se prejudice, however, and courts
presume the error caused harm. For example, courts will assume prejudicial
error if the defendant demonstrates an actual conflict of interest with counsel and
a lapse in representation. 147 Courts have also found that an attorney's absence
during a critical stage of the trial qualifies as per se prejudicial. 148 Notably, the
Supreme Court has justified irrebuttable presumptions under this analysis in part
because when prejudice is highly likely, a "case-by-case inquiry into prejudice is
not worth the cost.
' 149
IV. CONCLUSION
It is important to distinguish the two claims that this article makes. The first
claim is courts may legitimately interpret a statute in an overinclusive, rule-like
fashion. Although this claim is important, it should be uncontroversial because
courts commonly use rule-like approaches to decide individual cases. The
second claim is that in the Title VII context, courts should prohibit all
harassment that is sexual or sex-specific regardless of the sex or sexual
orientation (or any other personal characteristic) of the plaintiff. This is the
bolder claim. It is also where the discussion over prohibiting sexual harassment
and Title Vil's appropriate scope should take place.
All sexual harassment may not qualify as sex discrimination but one must
weigh the problem of taking an overinclusive approach against what is lost if the
issue is approached case-by-case. A rule-free, individualized approach increases
the costs of making the decision, increases the amount of arbitrariness in the
decision-making, and decreases the law's predictability for employers and
employees. At the same time, an individualized approach that looks at the sex or
sexual orientation of the plaintiffs to determine liability may run afoul of the
Constitution. Once all of this is considered, we may well agree that all sexual
harassment in the workplace should be prohibited.
147. United States v. O'Neil, 118 F.3d 65, 71 (2d Cir. 1997).
148. E.g., Green v. Am, 809 F.2d 1257, 1262-63 (6th Cir. 1987), vacated, 484 U.S. 806 (1987),
reinstated on remand, 839 F.2d 300 (6th Cir. 1988) ("[There are,] however, circumstances that are so likely to
prejudice the accused that the cost of litigating their effect in a particular case is unjustified.... [For example,]
[a]bsence from the proceedings is deficient performance as a matter of law, and prejudice is presumed."
(emphasis added)); Martin v. Rose, 744 F.2d 1245, 1250-51 (6th Cir. 1984) (holding that counsel's lack of
participation rendered adversarial process unreliable, constituting per se prejudice).
149. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 692.
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APPENDIX:
Brief Summary of Major Statistics on Sexual Harassment:
U.S. MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD'S SURVEY (1980, 1987, 1994)
1. How Many Employees Experienced Sexually Harassing Behavior in the
Previous Two Years?
150




2. The Harasser's Sex (1994)?'15
The Victim's Sex
The Harasser's sex Women (%) Men (%)
Men 93 21
Women 1 65
Mixed group of 6 14
men and women
or unknown
150. U.S. MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD, SEXUAL HARASSMENT IN THE FEDERAL WORKPLACE:
TRENDS, PROGRESS, CONTINUING CHALLENGES 14 (1995).
151. Id. at 18.
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3. Forms of Sexual Harassment: Respondents Who Experienced the Indicated
Behaviors During the Preceding Two Years (1994)152
152. Id. at 16.
Women (%) Men
Sexual remarks, 37 14
jokes, teasing





Pressure for dates 13 4
Suggestive letters, 10 4
calls, materials
Stalking 7 2
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THREE STUDIES OF THE SEXUAL HARASSMENT OF MEN BY CRAIG R. WALDO,
JENNIFER L. BERDAHL AND LOUISE F. FITZGERALD' 53
1. Forms of Harassment
54
153. Craig R. Waldo et. al, Are Men Sexually Harassed? If So, by Whom?, 22 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 59
(1998).
154. Id. at 67.
Study I (% Study 2 (% Study 3 (%
of men of men of men
surveyed) surveyed) surveyed)




Sexual 1.9 0 3.6
coercion
Unwanted 17.9 11.5 29.0
sexual
advances
Lewd 38.7 37.8 44.1
comments
Negative 24.0 25.6 33.3
remarks
about men





2. Who harasses men? 155
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The Study I (% of Study 2 (% of Study 3 (% of
Harasser's men harassed) men men harassed)
Sex harassed)
Men or 52.7 50.2 39.8
mostly
men
Women or 30.1 31.7 31.9
mostly
women
Both men 17.2 19.1 28.3
and
women
OTHER STUDIES ON SEXUAL HARASSMENT
1. Navy-wide survey (1989) of personnel indicating they
someone of the same sex'
56 were harassed by
Women (%) Men (%)
0.5 40
2. Department of Defense survey (1988) of active-duty personnel15 7
Personnel reporting sexual harassment in the previous year
Women % Men %
Reporting sexual 64 17
Harassment
Percent of Sexual Harassment cases
gender
involving perpetrators of their victim's
Women % Men %
Same-Sex 3 37
Harasser
155. Id. at 69.
156. AMY L. CULBERTSON ET AL., ASSESSMENT OF SEXUAL HARASSMENT IN THE NAVY: RESULTS OF THE
1989 NAVY-WIDE SURVEY (1992).
157. John B. Pryor & Nora J. Whalen, A Typology of Sexual Harassment: Characteristics of Harassers
and Social Circumstances Under Which Sexual Harassment Occurs, in SEXUAL HARASSMENT: THEORY,
RESEARCH, TREATMENT 129, 140-41 (William O'Donohue ed., 1997).
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NUMBER OF COMPLAINTS FILED WITH THE EEOC 158
158. EEOC, Sexual Harassment Statistics FY 1991-FY 1997, at http://.wvwweeoc.gov/siats/harass.himl
(last visited January 15, 2001).
1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999




%Filedby 9.1 9.1 9.9 9.9 10.0 11.6 12.9 12.1
Men





% with 3.8 3.7 4.5 3.3 3.6 4.7 6.1 7.1
Reasonable
Cause
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